Claudine Gartenberg and Elaine Pak (2024), Internal and Market Pay References in Firms, .
Abstract: We examine how firms balance internal and external reference points when determining employee pay. Analyzing nearly 19 million confidential U.S. employee records, our analysis reveals three key findings. First, the relative sensitivity of pay to internal over external benchmarks increases with firm innovation intensity, employee skill level, and the combination of the two. Second, this relationship appears at least partly causal: we document similar patterns using an instrumental variables analysis based on regional inflation shocks and a differences-indifferences analysis of CEO transitions. Third, firms with a stronger internal pay orientation produce more and higher-quality patents, including more breakthrough innovations. Altogether, our findings reveal that, while some firms maintain close market alignment, knowledge-intensive firms appear to decouple pay from market forces. This is particularly the case for their skilled workers, consistent with firms prioritizing internal social dynamics in contexts where cooperation and creativity are important for value creation.
Claudine Gartenberg and Elaine Pak (Under Review), Corporate Ownership and Employee Compensation.
Abstract: The rise of active corporate owners has raised questions about their influence on stakeholder outcomes, particularly regarding employee compensation. Using detailed compensation records from 20 million employees across 896 U.S. firms, we document that firms controlled by active owners—hedge funds and private equity firms—pay 2 to 4% less for comparable work relative to other firms. These differences arise through lower base pay, particularly for lower-skilled workers, as well as flatter incentive structures, particularly for higher-skilled workers. These compensation differences are concentrated among workers in routine jobs, with active owners paying 2-5 % less and 7-20% lower bonus-to-base ratio for comparable work, while showing minimal difference among workers in non-routine positions. Through analyses of private equity buyouts, matched comparisons, and lead-lag tests, our evidence suggests these patterns reflect, at least partially, an ownership treatment effect. Altogether, our results suggest that these owners either place less value on routine work or substitute financial incentives with input monitoring and control. These patterns suggest that differences in ownership structure manifest not only in firm strategy and governance, but also in fundamental approaches to motivating and managing employees.
