This codebook reproduces excerpts from previously published research describing the construction of POLCONIII and POLCONV. It also lists the sources of the remaining variables in the Microsoft Access datafile that can be used to mate this database with other international datasets or that were used to construct these indexes. The 2005 release expands the scope of temporal coverage (up to 2004) of the POLCON dataset. It also corrects a small number of computational, coding and factual errors in the previous release. Please also note the change in the coding of the legislative effectiveness variable described below. Finally, by popular request, I include information on the identity of the head of state and government, the partisan affiliation of the head of state and government and the seat distribution by party in the upper and lower legislative chambers (where available). For any additional questions, please do not hesitate to contact me at henisz@wharton.upenn.edu.

ID

An autonumbered index or key

CNTS_COUNTRY

Country name for matching to the crossnational time series dataset :
http://www.databanks.sitehosting.net/

POLITY_COUNTRY

Country name for matching to the Polity datasets:
http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/inscr/polity/index.htm

ICRG COUNTRY

Country name for matching to the International Country Risk Guide datasets:
http://www.icrgonline.com/

CTRYNM

Country code for matching to any World Bank datasets

CNTS_CODE

Country code for matching to the crossnational time series dataset:
http://www.databanks.sitehosting.net/

YEAR

Year (**data as of January 1 of that year**):
http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/inscr/polity/index.htm

POLCONIII

The following excerpt describing the construction of this variable is taken from:

Henisz, W. J. (2002). "The Institutional Environment for Infrastructure Investment." Industrial and Corporate Change **11**(2): Forthcoming.

Please cite this publication when using this variable.

> "The measure of political constraints employed in this paper estimates the feasibility of policy change (the extent to which a change in the preferences of any one actor may lead to a change in government policy) using the following methodology. First, extracting data from political science databases, it identifies the number of independent branches of government (executive, lower and upper legislative chambers)[1] with veto power over policy change in [234] countries in every year [that they existed] from 1800 to [2001]. The preferences of each of these branches and the *status quo* policy are then assumed to be independently and identically drawn from a uniform, unidimensional policy space. This assumption allows for the derivation of a quantitative measure of institutional hazards using a simple spatial model of political interaction.
> This initial measure is then modified to take into account the extent of alignment across branches of government using data on the party composition of the executive and legislative branches. Such alignment increases the feasibility of policy change. The measure is then further modified to capture the extent of preference heterogeneity within each legislative branch which increases (decreases) decision costs of overturning policy for aligned (opposed) executive branches.
> The main results of the calculations detailed in Appendix 1 … are that (1) each additional veto point (a branch of government that is both constitutionally effective and controlled by a party different from other branches) provides a positive but diminishing effect on the total level of constraints on policy change and (2) homogeneity (heterogeneity) of party preferences within an opposition (aligned) branch of government is positively correlated with constraints on policy change. These results echo those produced in similar work by Tsebelis (1995; 1999) and Butler and Hammond (1997; 1996)."

From Appendix 1 of the same publication,

> "In order to construct a structurally-derived internationally comparable measure of political constraints, the structure of political systems must be simplified in a manner which allows for cross-national comparisons over a wide range countries while retaining the elements of that structure which have a strong bearing on the feasibility of policy change. Here, I will focus on two such elements: the number of independent veto points over policy outcomes and the distribution of preferences of the actors that inhabit them. Without minimizing their importance, I set aside questions of agenda setting power, decision costs (Schwartz, Spiller, and Urbiztondo, 1994; Spiller, 1992; Spiller and Tiller, 1997) and the relative political authority held

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[1] Previous derivations of the political constraint index described here have included an independent judiciary and sub-federal political entities for a total of five potential veto points. Data limitations preclude their inclusion here. The effect of their omission will be to diminish the variance among countries with relatively high levels of political constraints thereby dampening the magnitude of the observed effect.

by various institutions for subsequent extensions of the admittedly simplistic modeling framework presented here.

Political actors will be denoted by E (for executive), L1 (for lower house of legislature), L2 (for upper house of legislature).[2] Each political actor has a preference, denoted by X_I where I $\in$ [E, L1, L2]. Assume, for the time being, that the status quo policy (X_0) and the preferences of all actors are independently and identically drawn from a uniformly distributed unidimensional policy space [0,1]. Data on actual preference distributions of political actors will subsequently be incorporated into the analysis loosening this assumption. The utility of political actor I from a policy outcome X is assumed equal to $-|X - X_I|$ and thus ranges from a maximum of 0 (when X = X_I) to a minimum of -1 (when X = 0 and X_I = 1 or vice versa). Further assume that each actor has veto power over final policy decisions. While these are, admittedly, strong assumptions, the incorporation of more refined and realistic game structures and preference distributions presents severe complications for analytic tractability. It is hoped that, mirroring the development of the domestic positive political theory literature, the strength of the results obtained using the simple framework presented here will provide an impetus for future research.

The variable of interest to investors in this model is the extent to which a given political actor[3] is constrained in his or her choice of future policies. This variable is calculated as (1 - the level of political discretion). Discretion is operationalized as the expected range of policies for which all political actors with veto power can agree upon a change in the status quo. For example, regardless of the status quo policy, an unchecked executive can always obtain policy X_E and is guaranteed their maximum possible utility of 0. Investors face a high degree of uncertainty since the executive's preferences may change or the executive may be replaced by another executive with vastly different preferences. Therefore this is categorized as a polar case in which political discretion = 1 and political constraints equals 0 (1 - 1).

As the number of actors with independent veto power increases, the level of political constraints increases. For example, in a country with an effective unicameral legislature (L1), the executive must obtain the approval of a majority of the legislature in order to implement policy changes. The Executive is no longer guaranteed the policy X_E as the legislature may veto a change from the status quo policy. The Executive can, at best, achieve the outcomes closest to X_E that is preferred by the legislature to the status quo. Without additional information on the preferences of the Executive and the legislature it is impossible to compute the exact outcome of the game. Nor is the expected magnitude of the effect on political discretion of adding this additional veto point immediately clear. However, one of the virtues of the simple spatial model outlined above is that it provides a more objective insight into the quantitative significance of adding an additional veto point.

Given the assumption that preferences are drawn independently and identically from a uniform distribution, the expected difference between the preferences of any two actors can be

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[2] Data limitations of the panel preclude the inclusion of other veto points such as an independent judiciary, sub-federal units of power, administrative agencies and the like.

[3] Without loss of generality, the remainder of the paper refers to changes in executive preferences. Note that since the preferences of all actors and the status quo policy are drawn identically from the same distribution, each actor, including the executive, faces the same constraints in changing policy. Allowance for the likelihood of multiple actors changing preferences simultaneously is made by incorporating information on alignment of preferences across the various branches of government later in the analysis.

expressed as $1/(n+2)$[4] where n is the number of actors. Assuming that there exist two political institutions with veto power (the Executive (E) and a unicameral legislature (L1)), the initial preference draw yields an expected preference difference equal to $1/(2 + 2) = 1/4$. There are six possible preference orderings in this game (see Figure 1) that we will assume are equally likely to occur in practice.[5]

In ordering (1), no change in executive preferences which retains the initial ordering of preferences yields a change in policy. The executive ($X_E = 1/4$) prefers all policies between $1/2 - \varepsilon$ and $0 + \varepsilon$ to the status quo ($X_0 = 1/2$) while the legislature ($X_{L1} = 3/4$) prefers all policies between $1/2 + \varepsilon$ and $1 - \varepsilon$ to X_0. As the executive and the legislature cannot agree on a change in policy, political discretion (the feasibility of policy change) equals 0 and political constraints equal 1. The same argument is true by symmetry for ordering (2). In the remaining orderings, both the executive and legislature agree on a direction in which policy should move relative to the status quo X_0. These cases have closed form solutions other than the status quo policy. Their exact values depend on the assumption as to who moves first (or last) and the relative costs of review by each party.

However, in the absence of knowledge on the rules of the game in each country, the range of outcomes over which both parties can agree to change the status quo is used as a measure of political discretion. As this range expands, there exists a larger set of policy changes preferred by both political actors with veto power. The existence of such a set reduces the credibility of any given policy and therefore decreases the level of political constraints. In ordering (3), the executive ($X_E = 1/2$) prefers policies between $1/4 + \varepsilon$ and $3/4 - \varepsilon$ to the status quo ($X_0 = 1/4$) while the legislature ($X_{L1} = 3/4$) prefers all policies greater than $1/4 + \varepsilon$. There exists a range of policies approximately equal to $1/2$ (between $1/4 + \varepsilon$ and $3/4 - \varepsilon$), which both actors agree are superior to the status quo. The political discretion measure for this ordering therefore equals $1/2$ yielding a political constraints measure equal to $1/2$. The same is true in orderings (4), (5) and (6). The expected level of political constraints for the game $\{X_E , X_{L1}\}$ based on the number of veto points alone is the average of the political constraint measures across the six possible preference orderings: $(1 + 1 + 1/2 + 1/2 + 1/2 + 1/2)/6 = 2/3$.

Note that this initial measure of political constraints is based solely on the number of de jure veto points in a given polity maintaining the strong and unrealistic assumption of uniformly distributed preferences. However, neither the Constitutional existence of veto power nor its prior exercise provide a de facto veto threat in the current period. Specifically, loosening the assumption of uniformly distributed preferences by allowing for preference alignment (i.e., majority control of the executive and the legislature by the same party) would be expected to expand the range of political discretion and thereby decrease the level of political constraints. In order to allow for this effect, the purely institutional measure of political constraints described above is supplemented with information on the preferences of various actors and their possible alignments. For example, if the legislature were completely aligned with the executive, the game

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[4] See Rice (1995:p. 155). The intuition for this result is that the expectation of any single draw is equal to 1/2 but there exists variation across draws. Given a uniform distribution, the expected distance between any two adjacent positions declines proportionally to the number of additional draws. The exact formula is 1/(# of draws + 1).

[5] For expositional convenience, I center each of the preference distributions on the unit line. As long as the expected difference between any two preferred points remains 1/4, the quantitative results are insensitive to the absolute location of these points. For example, were the leftmost (rightmost) point in each distribution to be placed at 0 (1) rather than 1/4 (3/4), the quantitative results would be unchanged.

would revert back to our simple unitary actor discussed above with a constraint measure of 0. The same exercise of determining constraints given the assumption of either completely independent or completely aligned actors was conducted for all observed institutional structures yielding the values for political constraints displayed in Table 1.

Further modifications are required when other political actors are neither completely aligned with nor completely independent from the executive. In these cases, the party composition of the other branches of government are also relevant to the level of constraints. For example, if the party controlling the executive enjoys a majority in the legislature, the level of constraints is negatively correlated with the concentration of that majority. Aligned legislatures with large majorities are less costly to manage and control than aligned legislatures that are highly polarized.

By contrast, when the executive is faced with an opposition legislature, the level of constraints is positively correlated with the concentration of the legislative majority. A heavily fractionalized opposition may provide the executive with more discretion due to the difficulty in forming a cohesive legislative opposition bloc to any given policy. Information on the partisan alignment of different government branches and on the difficulty of forming a majority coalition within them can therefore provide valuable information as to the extent of political constraints.

Suppose, for example, that the party controlling the executive completely controls the other branch(es) of government (100%[6] of legislative seats). In this case, the values displayed in the appropriate right-hand column of Table 1 are utilized. However, as the executive's need for coalition building and maintenance increases (his or her majority diminishes), and under the assumption that the same party controls both branches, the values converge to the levels displayed in the left-most column. For the case in which the branches are controlled by different parties, the results are reversed. Now, complete concentration by the opposition (100% legislative seats) leads to the assignment of the values in the left-most column. As the opposition's difficulty of forming coalitions increases, the values converge to the levels displayed in the appropriate right-hand column. Following an extensive body of literature in political science on the costs of forming and maintaining coalitions, the rate of convergence is based upon the extent of legislative (or judicial) fractionalization (Rae and Taylor, 1970).

The fractionalization of the legislature (or court) is equal to the probability that two random draws from the legislature or court are from different parties. The exact formula is:

$$1 - \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left[\frac{(n_i - 1)\frac{n_i}{N}}{N - 1} \right]$$

where n = the number of parties, n_i = seats held by nth party and N = total seats.

The final value of political constraints for cases in which the executive is aligned with the legislature(s) is thus equal to the value derived under complete alignment plus the fractionalization index multiplied by the difference between the independent and completely aligned values calculated above. For cases in which the executives party is in the minority in the legislature(s), the modified constraint measure equals the value derived under complete alignment plus (one minus the fractionalization index) multiplied by the difference between the

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[6] I assume that as the majority diminishes from this absolute level the difficulty in satisfying the preferences of all coalition or faction members increases thus increasing the level of political constraints.

completely independent and dependent values calculated above. In cases of mixed alignment, a weighted (equally) sum of the relevant adjustments is used.

For example, in the case described above the constraint measure equaled 0 if the legislature was completely aligned and 2/3 if it was completely independent. However, if the same party controls the executive and the legislative chamber and the probability of two random draws from the legislature belonging to different parties equals 1/4 (the executive has a large majority in Parliament) then the modified constraint measure equals $0 + 1/4 * (2/3 - 0) = 1/6$. By contrast, if the executive relied on a heavily fractionalized coalition in which the probability that any two random draws were from different parties was 75%, the modified constraint measure would equal $0 + 3/4 * (2/3 - 0) = 1/2$. In the case where the opposition controls the legislature the values would be reversed. A heavily concentrated majority by the opposition would lead to a value of $0 + (1 - 1/4) * (2/3 - 0) = 1/2$ while a fractionalized legislature would receive a score of $0 + (1 - 3/4) * (2/3) = 1/6$.

This measure of political constraints has one important virtue that also yields several weaknesses. The strength of the measure is that it is structurally derived from a simple spatial model of political interaction which incorporates data on the number of independent political institutions with veto power in a given polity and data on the alignment and heterogeneity of the political actors that inhabit those institutions. The first weakness of the measure is that its validity is based upon the validity of the assumptions imposed upon the spatial model in order to generate quantitative results. Another weakness is that many features of interest are left out of the model including agenda setting rights, decision costs, other relevant procedural issues, the political role of the military and/or church, cultural/racial tensions, and other informal institutions which impact economic outcomes."

The specific formulae used to construct the index are:

Condition	Calculation
L1=0	0
L1=1 And L2=0 And Align E_L1=1	(LEGFRA lower)*0.6667
L1=1 And L2=0 And Align E_L1=0	(1-LEGFRA lower)*0.6667
L1=1 And L2=1 And Align E_L1=1 And Align E_L2=1	((LEGFRA lower + LEGRFRA upper)/2)*0.8
L1=1 And L2=1 And Align E_L1=1 And Align E_L2=0	(((LEGFRA lower)+(1-LEGFRA upper))/2)*0.8
L1=1 And L2=1 And Align E_L1=0 And Align E_L2=1	(((1-LEGFRA lower)+(LEGFRA upper))/2)*0.8
L1=1 And L2=1 And Align E_L1=0 And Align E_L2=0	(1-(LEGFRA lower + LEGFRA upper)/2)*0.8

Figure 1: The Six Possible Preference Ordering of the Game $\{X_E, X_{L1}\}$

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        0      1/4    1/½    3/4    1          0      1/4    1/½    3/4    1
(1)    _____         _____         (4)
              X_E    X_0    X_L1                     X_0    X_L1   X_E
       EEEEEEEEEEE                                 EEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE
                      LLLLLLLLLLL                  LLLLLLLLLLL

        0      1/4    1/½    3/4    1          0      1/4    1/½    3/4    1
(2)    _____         _____         (5)
              X_L1   X_0    X_E                      X_E    X_L1   X_0
                     EEEEEEEEEE           EEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE
       LLLLLLLLLL                                 LLLLLLLLLLL

        0      1/4    1/½    3/4    1          0      1/4    1/½    3/4    1
(3)    _____         _____         (6)
              X_0    X_E    X_L1                     X_L1   X_E    X_0
              EEEEEEEEEEE                            EEEEEEEEEEE
              LLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLL                 LLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLL
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Note : E indicates the range of outcomes preferred by the executive to the status quo X_0
L indicates the range of outcomes preferred by the legislature to the status quo X

Table 1: Political Constraints with Complete Independence/Alignment

Independent Political Actors	*Entities Completely Aligned with Executive*		
	None	*(L1 or L2)*	L1&L2
E	0		
E, L1	2/3	0	
E, L1, L2	4/5	2/3	0

Note: E = executive, L1 = lower legislature, L2 = upper legislature

Data on POLCONIII is available for the following 226 countries between the following years (though not necessarily continuously).

Country	MinOfYear	MaxOfYear
ABYSSINIA	1855	1945
AFGHANISTAN	1800	2004
ALBANIA	1913	2004
ALGERIA	1962	2004
ANDORRA	1975	2004
ANGOLA	1975	2004
ANTIGUA	1981	2004
ARGENTINA	1816	2004
ARMENIA	1991	2004
AUST EMPIRE	1800	1860
AUST-HUNG	1898	1918
AUSTRALIA	1901	2004
AUSTRIA	1919	2004
AZERBAIJAN	1991	2004
BAHRAIN	1971	2004
BANGLADESH	1971	2004
BARBADOS	1966	2004
BELARUS	1991	2004
BELGIUM	1830	2004
BELIZE	1981	2004
BENIN	1975	2004
BHUTAN	1907	2004
BOLIVIA	1836	2004
BOSNIA-HERZ	1993	2004
BOTSWANA	1966	2004
BRAZIL	1823	2004
BRUNEI	1984	2004
BULGARIA	1881	2004
BURKNA FASO	1984	2004
BURMA	1954	1988
BURUNDI	1962	2004
C VERDE IS	1975	2004
CAMBODIA	1953	2004
CAMEROON	1960	2004
CANADA	1867	2004
CEN AFR EMP	1976	1978
CEN AFR REP	1962	2004
CEYLON	1960	1970
CHAD	1961	2004
CHILE	1818	2004
CHINA	1800	1918
CHINA PR	1949	2004
CHINA REP	1919	1948
COLOMBIA	1830	2004
COMORO IS	1975	2004

CONGO	1971	1996
CONGO (BRA)	1961	1970
CONGO (KIN)	1960	1963
CONGO DR	1964	2004
CONGO REP	1997	2004
COSTA RICA	1838	2004
COTE D'IVOR	1985	2004
CROATIA	1991	2004
CUBA	1902	2004
CYPRUS	1960	2004
CZECH REP	1993	2004
CZECHOS'KIA	1920	1992
DAHOMEY	1960	1974
DENMARK	1800	2004
DJIBOUTI	1977	2004
DOMIN REP	1919	2004
DOMINICA	1981	2004
ECUADOR	1830	2004
EGYPT	1922	2004
EL SALVADOR	1841	2004
EQUA GUINEA	1969	2004
ERITREA	1993	2004
ESTONIA	1934	2004
ETHIOPIA	1946	1986
ETH'PIA PDR	1987	2004
FED MALAYA	1960	1962
FIJI	1975	2004
FINLAND	1917	2004
FRANCE	1800	2004
GABON	1961	2004
GAMBIA	1967	2004
GEORGIA	1991	2004
GERMAN DR	1949	1989
GERMAN FR	1949	1989
GERMANY	1871	2004
GHANA	1957	2004
GREECE	1827	2004
GRENADA	1974	2004
GUATEMALA	1839	2004
GUINEA	1958	2004
GUINEA-B'AU	1974	2004
GUYANA	1966	2004
HAITI	1815	2004
HONDURAS	1838	2004
HONG KONG	1843	1996
HUNGARY	1867	2004
ICELAND	1918	2004
INDIA	1960	2004

INDONESIA	1945	2004
IRAN	1935	2004
IRAQ	1924	2004
IRELAND	1922	2004
ISRAEL	1949	2004
ITALY	1895	2004
IVORY COAST	1960	1984
JAMAICA	1959	2004
JAPAN	1800	2004
JORDAN	1946	2004
KAMPUCHEA	1975	1989
KAZAKHSTAN	1991	2004
KENYA	1964	2004
KHMER REP	1971	1974
KOREA	1800	1910
KOREA PR	1948	2004
KOREA REP	1948	2004
KUWAIT	1962	2004
KYRGYZSTAN	1991	2004
LAOS	1954	2004
LATVIA	1927	2004
LEBANON	1944	2004
LESOTHO	1966	2004
LIBERIA	1847	2004
LIBYA	1951	2004
LIECHTSTEIN	1987	2004
LITHUANIA	1926	2004
LUXEMBOURG	1920	2004
MACEDONIA	1991	2004
MADAGASCAR	1975	2004
MALAGASY R	1961	1974
MALAWI	1965	2004
MALAYSIA	1963	2004
MALDIVE IS	1975	2004
MALI	1960	2004
MALTA	1977	2004
MARSHALL IS	1986	2004
MAURITANIA	1961	2004
MAURITIUS	1968	2004
MEXICO	1821	2004
MOLDOVA	1991	2004
MONGOLIA	1921	2004
MOROCCO	1800	2004
MOZAMBIQUE	1976	2004
MYANMAR	1989	2004
NAMIBIA	1991	2004
NAURU	1968	2004
NEPAL	1800	2004

NETHERLANDS	1815	2004
NEW ZEALAND	1857	2004
NICARAGUA	1838	2004
NIGER	1960	2004
NIGERIA	1960	2004
NORWAY	1882	2004
OMAN	1800	2004
OTTOMAN EMP	1800	1918
PAKISTAN	1947	2004
PALAU	1994	2004
PANAMA	1928	2004
PAPUA NEW G	1976	2004
PARAGUAY	1812	2004
PERSIA	1800	1934
PERU	1821	2004
PHILIPPINES	1937	2004
POLAND	1919	2004
PORTUGAL	1800	2004
QATAR	1971	2004
RHODESIA	1979	1979
ROMANIA	1859	2004
RUSSIA	1800	2004
RWANDA	1961	2004
SAINT LUCIA	1980	2004
SAMOA	1998	2004
SAN MARINO	1979	2004
SANTO DOMIN	1844	1918
SAO TOME/PR	1976	1990
SA'U ARABIA	1926	2004
SENEGAL	1960	2004
SERBIA	1830	1920
SEYCHELLES	1977	1998
SEYCHELLSS	1999	2004
SIAM	1800	1918
SIERRA LEO	1961	2004
SINGAPORE	1965	2004
SLOVAK REP	1993	2004
SLOVENIA	1991	2004
SO AFRICA	1910	2004
SOLOMON IS	1985	2004
SOMALIA	1965	2004
SPAIN	1800	2004
SRI LANKA	1971	2004
ST KITT/NEV	1984	2004
ST VINCENT	1985	2004
SUDAN	1958	2004
SURINAME	1980	1986
SWAZILAND	1968	2004

SWEDEN	1800	2004
SWITZERLAND	1815	2004
SYRIA	1947	2004
TAIWAN	1949	2004
TAJIKISTAN	1991	2004
TANGANYIKA	1963	1963
TANZANIA	1964	2004
THAILAND	1919	2004
TOGO	1961	2004
TRINIDAD	1967	2004
TUNISIA	1959	2004
TURKEY	1919	2004
TURKMENSTAN	1991	2004
UA EMIRATES	1971	2004
UAR	1958	1970
UGANDA	1962	2004
UK	1833	2004
UKRAINE	1991	2004
UPPER VOLTA	1960	1983
URUGUAY	1828	2004
US	1800	2004
USSR	1919	1990
UZBEKISTAN	1991	2004
VANUATU	1980	2004
VENEZUELA	1830	2004
VIETNAM	1976	2004
VIETNAM DR	1954	1975
VIETNAM REP	1954	1975
WESTN SAMOA	1985	1997
YEMEN	1918	1961
YEMEN AR	1962	1989
YEMEN PDR	1967	1989
YEMEN REP	1990	2004
YUGOSLAVIA	1919	2003
ZAIRE	1971	1996
ZAMBIA	1964	2004
ZIMBABWE	1980	2004

POLCONV

The following excerpt describing the construction of this variable is taken from:

Henisz, W. J. (2000). "The Institutional Environment for Economic Growth." Economics and Politics **12**(1): 1-31.

Please cite this publication when using this variable. Note that the following derivation follows the same logic as POLCONIII_2002 but also includes two additional veto points (the judiciary and sub_federal entities). There is both substantial academic debate on the efficacy of these additional veto players and substantial data limitations in the measurement of their existence.

"A New Measure of Credible Commitment
Modeling Approach
 …In order to construct a structurally-derived internationally comparable measure of political constraints, the structure of political systems must be simplified in a manner which allows for cross-national comparisons as many as 157 countries while retaining the elements of that structure which have a strong bearing on the feasibility of policy change. Here, I will focus on two such elements: the number of independent veto points over policy outcomes and the distribution of preferences of the actors that inhabit them. Without minimizing their importance, I set aside questions of agenda setting power, decision costs [see Spiller and Tiller (1997)] and the relative political authority held by various institutions for subsequent extensions of the admittedly simplistic modeling framework presented here.
 Political actors will be denoted by E (for executive), $L1$ (for lower house of legislature), $L2$ (for upper house of legislature), F (sub-federal units) and J (judiciary). Each political actor has a preference, denoted by X_I where $I \in [E, L1, L2, F, J]$. Assume, initially, that the status quo policy (X_0) and the preferences of all actors are independently and identically drawn from a uniformly distributed unidimensional policy space [0,1]. The utility of political actor I from a policy outcome X is assumed equal to $-|X - X_I|$ and thus ranges from a maximum of 0 (when $X = X_I$) to a minimum of -1 (when $X = 0$ and $X_I = 1$ or vice versa). Further assume that each actor has veto power over final policy decisions. While these are, admittedly, strong assumptions, the incorporation of more refined and realistic game structures and preference distributions presents severe complications for analytic tractability. It is hoped that, mirroring the development of the positive political theory literature domestically, the strength of the results obtained using the simple framework presented here will provide an impetus for future research.
 The variable of interest to investors in this model is the extent to which a given political actor[7] is constrained in his or her choice of future policies. This variable is calculated as one minus the expected range of policies for which a change in the status quo can be agreed upon by all political actors with veto power. For example, regardless of the status quo policy, an unchecked executive can always obtain policy X_E and is guaranteed their maximum possible utility of 0. Investors face a high degree of uncertainty since the executive's preferences may

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[7.] Without loss of generality, the remainder of the paper refers to changes in executive preferences. Note that since the preferences of all actors and the status quo policy are drawn identically from the same distribution, each actor, including the executive, faces the same constraints in changing policy. Allowance for the likelihood of multiple actors changing preferences simultaneously is made by incorporating information on alignment of preferences across the various branches of government later in the analysis.

change or the executive may be replaced by another executive with vastly different preferences. I therefore categorize this as a polar case in which political discretion equals 1 and political constraints (1 - political discretion) = 0.

As the number of actors with independent veto power increases, the level of political constraints increases. For example, in a country with an effective unicameral legislature ($L1$), the executive must obtain the approval of a majority of the legislature in order to implement policy changes. The Executive is no longer guaranteed the policy X_E as the legislature may veto a change from the status quo policy. The Executive can, at best, achieve the outcome closest to X_E that is preferred by the legislature to the status quo. Without additional information on the preferences of the Executive and the legislature it is impossible to compute the exact outcome of the game. Nor is the expected magnitude of the effect on political discretion of adding this additional veto point immediately clear. However, one of the virtues of the simple spatial model outlined above is that it provides a more objective insight into the quantitative significance of adding an additional veto point.

Given the assumption that preferences are drawn independently and identically from a uniform distribution, the expected difference between the preferences of any two actors can be expressed as $1/(n+2)$[8] where n is the number of actors. Assuming that there exist two political institutions with veto power (the Executive (E) and a unicameral legislature ($L1$)), the initial preference draw yields an expected preference difference equal to $1/(2 + 2) = 1/4$. There are six possible preference orderings in this game [see Figure 2] that I will assume are equally likely to occur in practice.[9]

In ordering (1), no change in executive preferences that retains the initial ordering of preferences yields a change in policy. The executive ($X_E = 1/4$) prefers all policies between $1/2 - \varepsilon$ and $0 + \varepsilon$ to the status quo ($X_0 = 1/2$) while the legislature ($X_{L1} = 3/4$) prefers all policies between $1/2 + \varepsilon$ and $1 - \varepsilon$ to X_0. As the executive and the legislature cannot agree on a change in policy, political discretion (the feasibility of policy change) equals 0 and political constraints equal 1. The same argument is true by symmetry for ordering (2). In the remaining orderings, both the executive and legislature agree on a direction in which policy should move relative to the status quo X_0. These cases have closed form solutions other than the status quo policy. Their exact values depend on the assumption as to who moves first (or last) and the relative costs of review by each party.

However, in the absence of knowledge on the rules of the game in each country, the range of outcomes over which both parties can agree to change the status quo is used as a measure of political discretion. As this range expands, there exists a larger set of policy changes preferred by both political actors with veto power. The existence of such a set reduces the credibility of any given policy. In ordering (3), the executive ($X_E = 1/2$) prefers policies between $1/4 + \varepsilon$ and $3/4 - \varepsilon$ to the status quo ($X_0 = 1/4$) while the legislature ($X_{L1} = 3/4$) prefers all policies greater than $1/4 + \varepsilon$. There exists a range of policies approximately equal to $1/2$ (between $1/4 + \varepsilon$ and $3/4 - \varepsilon$), which both actors agree are superior to the status quo. The political discretion measure for this ordering therefore equals $1/2$ yielding a political constraint measure

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[8.] See Rice (1995):p. 155.

[9.] For expositional convenience, I center each of the preference distributions on the unit line. As long as the expected difference between any two preferred points remains $1/4$, the quantitative results are insensitive to the absolute location of these points.

also equal to 1/2. The same is true in orderings (4), (5) and (6). The expected level of political constraints for the game
$\{X_E , X_{L1}\}$ based on the number of veto points alone is the average of the political constraint measures across the six possible preference orderings: $(1 + 1 + ½ + ½ + ½ + ½)/6 = 2/3$.

Note that this measure of political constraints is based solely on the number of de jure veto points in a given polity maintaining the strong and unrealistic assumption of uniformly distributed preferences. However, neither the Constitutional existence of veto power nor its prior exercise provide a de facto veto threat in the current period. Specifically, alignment (i.e., majority control of the executive and the legislature by the same party) would be expected to expand the range of political discretion and thereby reduce the level of political constraints. In order to allow for this effect, the purely institutional measure of political constraints described above is supplemented with information on the preferences of various actors. For example, if the legislature were completely aligned with the executive, the game would revert back to our simple unitary actor discussed above with a constraint measure of 0. The same exercise of determining constraints given the assumption of either completely independent or completely aligned actors was conducted for all observed institutional structures yielding the values for political constraints displayed in Table 2.

Further modifications are required when other political actors are neither completely aligned with nor completely independent from the executive. In these cases, the party composition of the other branches of government are also relevant to the level of constraints. For example, if the party controlling the executive enjoys a majority in the legislature, the level of constraints is negatively correlated with the magnitude and concentration of that majority. Aligned legislatures with large homogeneous majorities are less costly to manage and control than aligned legislatures with precarious majorities that are highly heterogeneous and/or polarized.

By contrast, when the executive is faced with an opposition legislature, the level of constraints is positively correlated with the magnitude and concentration of the legislative majority. A heavily fractionalized opposition with a precarious majority may provide the executive with a lower level of constraints due to the difficulty in forming a cohesive legislative opposition bloc to any given policy. Information on the partisan alignment of different government branches and on the difficulty of forming a majority coalition within them can therefore provide valuable information as to the extent of political constraints.

Suppose, for example, that the party controlling the executive completely controls the other branch(es) of government (100%[10] of legislative seats or supreme court justices). In this case, the values displayed in the appropriate right-hand column of Table 2 are utilized. However, as the executive's need for coalition building and maintenance increases (his or her majority diminishes), and under the assumption that the same party controls both branches, the values converge to the levels displayed in the left-most column. For the case in which the branches are controlled by different parties, the results are reversed. Now, complete concentration by the opposition (100% legislative seats or supreme court justices) leads to the assignment of the values in the left-most column. As the opposition's difficulty of forming coalitions increases, the values converge to the levels displayed in the appropriate right-hand column. Following an

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[10.] I assume that as the majority diminishes from this absolute level the difficulty in satisfying the preferences of all coalition or faction members increases thus increasing the level of political constraints.

extensive body of literature in political science on the costs of forming and maintaining coalitions, the rate of convergence is based upon the extent of legislative (or judicial) fractionalization (Rae and Taylor (1970).

The fractionalization of the legislature (or court) is approximately equal to the probability that two random draws from the legislature or court are from different parties. The exact formula is:

$$1 - \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left[\frac{(n_i - 1)\dfrac{n_i}{N}}{N - 1} \right]$$

where n = the number of parties, n_i = the number of seats held by ith party and N = the total number of seats. The final value of political constraints for cases in which the executive is aligned with the legislature(s) and/or court is thus equal to the value derived under complete alignment plus the fractionalization index multiplied by the difference between the independent and completely aligned values calculated above. For cases in which the executive's party is in the minority in the legislature(s) and/or courts, the modified constraint measure equals the value derived under complete alignment plus (one minus the fractionalization index) multiplied by the difference between the completely independent and dependent values calculated above. In cases of mixed alignment, a weighted (equally) sum of the relevant adjustments is used.

For example, in the case described above the constraint measure equaled 0 if the legislature was completely aligned and 2/3 if it was completely independent. However, if the same party controls the executive and the legislative chamber and the fractionalization index equals 1/4 (the executive has a large and/or homogeneous majority in Parliament) then the modified constraint measure equals 0 + 1/4 * (2/3 - 0) = 1/6. By contrast, if the fractionalization index equals 3/4 (the executive's majority is very precarious and/or heterogeneous), the modified constraint measure would equal 0 + 3/4 * (2/3 - 0) = 1/2. In the case where the opposition controls the legislature the values would be reversed. A large and/or homogeneous opposition majority would lead to a value of 0 + (1 – 1/4) * (2/3 - 0) = 1/2 while a small and/or heterogeneous opposition legislature would yield a score of 0 + (1 - 3/4) * (2/3) = 1/6."

Figure 2: The Six Possible Preference Ordering of the Game {X_E, X_{L1}}

(1)

| 0 | 1/4 | 1/½ | 3/4 | 1 |

X_E X_0 X_{L1}
EEEEEEEEEEE
        LLLLLLLLLLL

(4)

| 0 | 1/4 | 1/½ | 3/4 | 1 |

     X_0 X_{L1} X_E
    EEEEEEEEEEEEEE
    LLLLLLLLLLL

(2)

| 0 | 1/4 | 1/½ | 3/4 | 1 |

X_{L1} X_0 X_E
     EEEEEEEEEE
LLLLLLLLLL

(5)

| 0 | 1/4 | 1/½ | 3/4 | 1 |

    X_E X_{L1} X_0
EEEEEEEEEEEEEEE
    LLLLLLLLLLL

(3)

| 0 | 1/4 | 1/½ | 3/4 | 1 |

X_0 X_E X_{L1}
EEEEEEEEEEE
LLLLLLLLLLLLLLLL

(6)

| 0 | 1/4 | 1/½ | 3/4 | 1 |

X_{L1} X_E X_0
  EEEEEEEEEEE
LLLLLLLLLLLLLLLL

Note : E indicates the range of outcomes preferred by the executive to the status quo X_0
L indicates the range of outcomes preferred by the legislature to the status quo X

Table 2: Political Constraints Assuming Complete Independence or Alignment

Independent Political Actors	None	*Entities Completely Aligned with Executive*				
		L[11]	*J*	*L1&L2*	*L&J*	*L1&L2&J*
E	0					
E, L1	2/3	0				
E, F	2/3					
E, J	2/3		0			
E, L1, F	4/5	2/3				
E, L1, L2	4/5	2/3		0		
E, L1, J	4/5	2/3	2/3		0	
E, L1, L2, F	13/15	4/5		2/3		
E, L1, F, J	13/15	4/5	4/5		2/3	
E, L1, L2, J	13/15	4/5	4/5	2/3	2/3	0
E, L1, L2, F, J	19/21	13/15	13/15	4/5	4/5	2/3

Note: *E* = executive, *L1* = lower legislature, *L2* = upper legislature, *F* = sub-federal, *J* = judiciary

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[11.] Either L1 or L2.

The specific formulae used to construct the index are as follows:

Condition	Calculation
$L1=0$ And polity_year > 1960	0
$L1=1$ And $L2=0$ And $J=0$ And $F=0$ And Align E_L1=1	(LEGRAL_2002)*0.6667
$L1=1$ And $L2=0$ And $J=0$ And $F=0$ And Align E_L1=0	(1-LEGRAL_2002)*0.6667
$L1=1$ And $L2=0$ And $J=1$ And $F=0$ And Align E_L1=1	0.6667+ (LEGRAL_2002*0.13333)
$L1=1$ And $L2=0$ And $J=1$ And $F=0$ And Align E_L1=0	0.6667+ ((1-LEGRAL_2002)*0.13333)
$L1=1$ And $L2=0$ And $J=0$ And $F=1$ And Align E_L1=1	0.6667+ (LEGRAL_2002*0.13333)
$L1=1$ And $L2=0$ And $J=0$ And $F=1$ And Align E_L1=0	0.6667+ ((1-LEGRAL_2002)*0.13333)
$L1=1$ And $L2=0$ And $J=1$ And $F=1$ And Align E_L1=1	0.8+ (LEGRAL_2002*0.0667)
$L1=1$ And $L2=0$ And $J=1$ And $F=1$ And Align E_L1=0	0.8+ ((1-LEGRAL_2002)*0.0667)
$L1=1$ And $L2=1$ And $J=0$ And $F=0$ And Align E_L1=1 And Align E_L2=1	((LEGRAL_2002+LEGRAU_2002)/2)*0.8
$L1=1$ And $L2=1$ And $J=0$ And $F=0$ And Align E_L1=1 And Align E_L2=0	(((LEGRAL_2002)+(1-LEGRAU_2002))/2)*0.8
$L1=1$ And $L2=1$ And $J=0$ And $F=0$ And Align E_L1=0 And Align E_L2=1	(((1-LEGRAL_2002)+(LEGRAU_2002))/2)*0.8
$L1=1$ And $L2=1$ And $J=0$ And $F=0$ And Align E_L1=0 And Align E_L2=0	(1-(LEGRAL_2002+LEGRAU_2002)/2)*0.8
$L1=1$ And $L2=1$ And $J=1$ And $F=0$ And Align E_L1=1 And Align E_L2=1	0.6667+(((LEGRAL_2002+LEGRAU_2002)/2)*0.1333)
$L1=1$ And $L2=1$ And $J=1$ And $F=0$ And Align E_L1=1 And Align E_L2=0	0.6667+((((LEGRAL_2002)+(1-LEGRAU_2002))/2)*0.1333)
$L1=1$ And $L2=1$ And $J=1$ And $F=0$ And Align E_L1=0 And Align E_L2=1	0.6667+((((1-LEGRAL_2002)+(LEGRAU_2002))/2)*0.1333)
$L1=1$ And $L2=1$ And $J=1$ And $F=0$ And Align E_L1=0 And Align E_L2=0	0.6667+((1-(LEGRAL_2002+LEGRAU_2002)/2)*0.1333)
$L1=1$ And $L2=1$ And $J=0$ And $F=1$ And Align E_L1=1 And Align E_L2=1	0.6667+(((LEGRAL_2002+LEGRAU_2002)/2)*0.1333)
$L1=1$ And $L2=1$ And $J=0$ And $F=1$ And Align E_L1=1 And Align E_L2=0	0.6667+((((LEGRAL_2002)+(1-LEGRAU_2002))/2)*0.1333)
$L1=1$ And $L2=1$ And $J=0$ And $F=1$ And Align E_L1=0 And Align E_L2=1	0.6667+((((1-LEGRAL_2002)+(LEGRAU_2002))/2)*0.1333)
$L1=1$ And $L2=1$ And $J=0$ And $F=1$ And Align E_L1=0 And Align E_L2=0	0.6667+((1-(LEGRAL_2002+LEGRAU_2002)/2)*0.1333)
$L1=1$ And $L2=1$ And $J=1$ And $F=1$ And Align E_L1=1 And Align E_L2=1	0.8+(((LEGRAL_2002+LEGRAU_2002)/2)*0.1048)
$L1=1$ And $L2=1$ And $J=1$ And $F=1$ And Align E_L1=1 And Align E_L2=0	0.8+((((LEGRAL_2002)+(1-LEGRAU_2002))/2)*0.1048)
$L1=1$ And $L2=1$ And $J=1$ And $F=1$ And Align E_L1=0 And Align E_L2=1	0.8+((((1-LEGRAL_2002)+(LEGRAU_2002))/2)*0.1048)
$L1=1$ And $L2=1$ And $J=1$ And $F=1$ And Align E_L1=0 And Align E_L2=0	0.8+((1-(LEGRAL_2002+LEGRAU_2002)/2)*0.1048)

Data for POLCONV are available for the following 200 countries between the following years (though not necessarily continuously):

cnts_country	MinOfYear	MaxOfYear
AFGHANISTAN	1960	2004
ALBANIA	1960	2004
ALGERIA	1962	2004
ANGOLA	1975	2004
ARGENTINA	1960	2004
ARMENIA	1995	2004
AUSTRALIA	1960	2004
AUSTRIA	1960	2004
AZERBAIJAN	1991	2004
BAHRAIN	1971	2004
BANGLADESH	1971	2004
BARBADOS	1966	2004
BELARUS	1991	2004
BELGIUM	1960	2004
BENIN	1975	2004
BHUTAN	1960	2004
BOLIVIA	1960	2004
BOSNIA-HERZ	1993	2004
BOTSWANA	1966	2004
BRAZIL	1960	2004
BRUNEI	1984	2004
BULGARIA	1960	2004
BURKNA FASO	1984	2004
BURMA	1960	1988
BURUNDI	1962	2004
C VERDE IS	1975	2004
CAMBODIA	1960	2004
CAMEROON	1960	2004
CANADA	1960	2004
CEN AFR EMP	1976	1978
CEN AFR REP	1962	2004
CEYLON	1960	1970
CHAD	1961	2004
CHILE	1960	2004
CHINA PR	1960	2004
COLOMBIA	1960	2004
COMORO IS	1975	2004
CONGO	1971	1996
CONGO (BRA)	1961	1970
CONGO (KIN)	1960	1963
CONGO DR	1964	2004
CONGO REP	1997	2004
COSTA RICA	1960	2004

COTE D'IVOR	1985	2004
CROATIA	1991	2004
CUBA	1960	2004
CYPRUS	1960	2004
CZECH REP	1993	2004
CZECHOS'KIA	1960	1992
DAHOMEY	1960	1974
DENMARK	1960	2004
DJIBOUTI	1977	2004
DOMIN REP	1960	2004
DOMINICA	1981	2004
ECUADOR	1963	2004
EGYPT	1971	2004
EL SALVADOR	1960	2004
EQUA GUINEA	1969	2004
ERITREA	1993	2004
ESTONIA	1993	2004
ETHIOPIA	1960	1986
ETH'PIA PDR	1987	2004
FED MALAYA	1960	1962
FIJI	1975	2004
FINLAND	1960	2004
FRANCE	1960	2004
GABON	1961	2004
GAMBIA	1967	2004
GEORGIA	1991	2004
GERMAN DR	1960	1989
GERMAN FR	1960	1989
GERMANY	1990	2004
GHANA	1960	2004
GREECE	1960	2004
GRENADA	1974	2004
GUATEMALA	1963	2004
GUINEA	1960	2004
GUINEA-B'AU	1974	2004
GUYANA	1966	2004
HAITI	1960	2004
HONDURAS	1960	2004
HONG KONG	1843	1996
HUNGARY	1960	2004
ICELAND	1960	2004
INDIA	1960	2004
INDONESIA	1960	2004
IRAN	1960	2004
IRAQ	1960	2004
IRELAND	1960	2004
ISRAEL	1960	2004
ITALY	1960	2004

IVORY COAST	1960	1984
JAMAICA	1960	2004
JAPAN	1960	2004
JORDAN	1960	2004
KAMPUCHEA	1975	1989
KAZAKHSTAN	1991	2004
KENYA	1964	2004
KHMER REP	1971	1974
KOREA PR	1960	2004
KOREA REP	1960	2004
KUWAIT	1962	2004
KYRGYZSTAN	1991	2004
LAOS	1960	2004
LATVIA	1991	2004
LEBANON	1960	2004
LESOTHO	1966	2004
LIBERIA	1960	2004
LIBYA	1960	2004
LITHUANIA	1991	2004
LUXEMBOURG	1960	2004
MACEDONIA	2003	2004
MADAGASCAR	1975	2004
MALAGASY R	1961	1974
MALAWI	1965	2004
MALAYSIA	1963	2004
MALDIVE IS	1975	2004
MALI	1960	2004
MAURITANIA	1961	2004
MAURITIUS	1968	2004
MEXICO	1960	2004
MOLDOVA	1991	2004
MONGOLIA	1960	2004
MOROCCO	1960	2004
MOZAMBIQUE	1976	2004
MYANMAR	1989	2004
NAMIBIA	1991	2004
NEPAL	1960	2004
NETHERLANDS	1960	2004
NEW ZEALAND	1960	2004
NICARAGUA	1960	2004
NIGER	1960	2004
NIGERIA	1960	2004
NORWAY	1960	2004
OMAN	1960	2004
PAKISTAN	1960	2004
PALAU	1994	2004
PANAMA	1960	2004
PAPUA NEW G	1976	2004

PARAGUAY	1960	2004
PERU	1960	2004
PHILIPPINES	1960	2004
POLAND	1960	2004
PORTUGAL	1960	2004
QATAR	1971	2004
RHODESIA	1979	1979
ROMANIA	1960	2004
RUSSIA	1991	2004
RWANDA	1961	2004
SAO TOME/PR	1976	1990
SA'U ARABIA	1960	2004
SENEGAL	1960	2004
SEYCHELLES	1977	1998
SEYCHELLSS	1999	2004
SIERRA LEO	1961	2004
SINGAPORE	1965	2004
SLOVAK REP	1993	2004
SLOVENIA	1991	2004
SO AFRICA	1960	2004
SOMALIA	1965	2004
SPAIN	1960	2004
SRI LANKA	1971	2004
SUDAN	1960	2004
SURINAME	1980	1986
SWAZILAND	1968	2004
SWEDEN	1960	2004
SWITZERLAND	1960	2004
SYRIA	1960	2004
TAIWAN	1960	2004
TAJIKISTAN	1991	2004
TANGANYIKA	1963	1963
TANZANIA	1964	2004
THAILAND	1960	2004
TOGO	1961	2004
TRINIDAD	1967	2004
TUNISIA	1960	2004
TURKEY	1960	2004
TURKMENSTAN	1991	2004
UA EMIRATES	1971	2004
UAR	1960	1970
UGANDA	1962	2004
UK	1960	2004
UKRAINE	1998	2004
UPPER VOLTA	1960	1983
URUGUAY	1960	2004
US	1960	2004
USSR	1960	1990

UZBEKISTAN	1991	2004
VENEZUELA	1960	2004
VIETNAM	1976	2004
VIETNAM DR	1960	1975
VIETNAM REP	1960	1975
YEMEN	1960	1961
YEMEN AR	1962	1989
YEMEN PDR	1967	1989
YEMEN REP	1990	2004
YUGOSLAVIA	1960	2003
ZAIRE	1971	1996
ZAMBIA	1964	2004
ZIMBABWE	1980	2004

L1

NB: DUE TO THE LACK OF UPDATING OF THE CROSS-NATIONAL TIME SERIES DATASET SINCE 1999, THE CODING OF LEGISLATIVE EFFECTIVENESS HAS BEEN CHANGED IN THIS RELEASE OF THE POLITICAL CONSTRAINT INDEX. FOR THE SAKE OF INTERNAL CONSISTENCY, THE NEW CODING PROCESS HAS BEEN USED ON ALL HISTORICAL DATA. IF YOU ARE INTERESTED IN THE OLD CODING PROCESS, PLEASE DOWNLOAD POLCON_2002.

Effective legislative chambers (L1=1) are found in countries where the Polity dataset indicated that constraints on executive discretion are greater 2 (see below for definition). The following 191 countries have between the minimum and maximum years specified (though not necessarily continuously) had an effective second legislative chamber:

cnts_country	MinOfYear	MaxOfYear
AFGHANISTAN	1965	1972
ALBANIA	1991	2004
ALGERIA	1989	2004
ANDORRA	1975	2004
ANGOLA	1975	2004
ANTIGUA	1981	2004
ARGENTINA	1854	2004
ARMENIA	1991	2004
AUST EMPIRE	1861	1866
AUST-HUNG	1867	1918
AUSTRALIA	1901	2004
AUSTRIA	1919	2004
AZERBAIJAN	1991	1993
BADEN	1862	1869
BAHAMAS	1973	2004
BANGLADESH	1971	2004
BARBADOS	1966	2004

BAVARIA	1848	1869
BELARUS	1991	1995
BELGIUM	1830	2004
BELIZE	1981	2004
BENIN	1991	2004
BOLIVIA	1826	2004
BOTSWANA	1966	2004
BRAZIL	1894	2004
BULGARIA	1879	2004
BURKNA FASO	2001	2004
BURMA	1948	1961
BURUNDI	1962	1965
C VERDE IS	1991	2004
CAMBODIA	1990	2004
CAMEROON	1961	1982
CANADA	1867	2004
CEN AFR REP	1960	2003
CEYLON	1948	1970
CHILE	1875	2004
CHINA PR	1977	2004
COLOMBIA	1832	2004
COMORO IS	1979	1999
CONGO	1992	1996
CONGO (BRA)	1964	1968
CONGO REP	1997	1997
COSTA RICA	1854	2004
COTE D'IVOR	1993	2002
CROATIA	1991	2004
CYPRUS	1960	2004
CZECH REP	1993	2004
CZECHOS'KIA	1919	1992
DAHOMEY	1960	1962
DENMARK	1849	2004
DJIBOUTI	1999	2004
DOMIN REP	1924	2004
DOMINICA	1979	2004
ECUADOR	1846	2004
EGYPT	1971	2004
EL SALVADOR	1903	2004
EQUA GUINEA	1968	2004
ERITREA	1993	2001
ESTONIA	1917	2004
ETH'PIA PDR	1996	2004
FED MALAYA	1958	1962
FIJI	1970	2004
FINLAND	1917	2004
FRANCE	1814	2004
GAMBIA	1965	1993

GEORGIA	1991	2004
GERMAN FR	1949	1989
GERMANY	1868	2004
GHANA	1969	2004
GREECE	1862	2004
GRENADA	1974	2004
GUATEMALA	1871	2004
GUINEA	1995	2004
GUINEA-B'AU	1974	2003
GUYANA	1966	2004
HAITI	1915	2004
HONDURAS	1919	2004
HUNGARY	1945	2004
ICELAND	1918	2004
INDIA	1950	2004
INDONESIA	1955	2004
IRAN	1947	2004
IRELAND	1922	2004
ISRAEL	1949	2004
ITALY	1861	2004
JAMAICA	1959	2004
JAPAN	1890	2004
JORDAN	1951	2004
KAMPUCHEA	1982	1989
KAZAKHSTAN	1991	1994
KENYA	1964	2004
KIRIBATI	1979	2004
KOREA REP	1960	2004
KUWAIT	1963	2004
KYRGYZSTAN	1991	2004
LAOS	1975	2004
LATVIA	1919	2004
LEBANON	1953	2004
LESOTHO	1966	2004
LIBERIA	1848	1979
LIECHTSTEIN	1975	2004
LITHUANIA	1918	2004
LUXEMBOURG	1890	2004
MACEDONIA	1991	2004
MADAGASCAR	1977	2004
MALAGASY R	1961	1972
MALAWI	1994	2004
MALAYSIA	1963	2004
MALDIVE IS	1965	1974
MALI	1960	2004
MALTA	1964	2004
MARSHALL IS	1986	2004
MAURITANIA	1961	2004

MAURITIUS	1968	2004
MEXICO	1827	2004
MICRONESIA	1986	2004
MOLDOVA	1991	2004
MONGOLIA	1960	2004
MOROCCO	1963	2004
MOZAMBIQUE	1986	2004
NAMIBIA	1991	2004
NAURU	1968	2004
NEPAL	1981	2001
NETHERLANDS	1840	2004
NEW ZEALAND	1876	2004
NICARAGUA	1912	2004
NIGER	1960	2004
NIGERIA	1960	2004
NORWAY	1814	2004
OTTOMAN EMP	1876	1911
PAKISTAN	1948	1999
PALAU	1994	2004
PANAMA	1904	2004
PAPUA NEW G	1976	2004
PARAGUAY	1919	2004
PERSIA	1906	1910
PERU	1827	2004
PHILIPPINES	1935	2004
POLAND	1918	2004
PORTUGAL	1834	2004
RHODESIA	1965	1978
ROMANIA	1862	2004
RUSSIA	1991	2004
RWANDA	2004	2004
SAINT LUCIA	1980	2004
SAMOA	1998	2004
SAN MARINO	1975	2004
SAO TOME/PR	1991	1998
SAO TOMEEPR	1999	2004
SENEGAL	1960	2004
SIERRA LEO	1961	2004
SINGAPORE	1965	2004
SLOVAK REP	1993	2004
SLOVENIA	1991	2004
SO AFRICA	1910	2004
SOLOMON IS	1978	2004
SOMALIA	1960	1968
SPAIN	1820	2004
SRI LANKA	1971	2004
ST KITT/NEV	1984	2004
ST VINCENT	1980	2004

SUDAN	1954	1988
SURINAME	1976	2004
SWEDEN	1812	2004
SWITZERLAND	1848	2004
SYRIA	1944	2004
TAIWAN	1975	2004
TAJIKISTAN	1991	2004
TANGANYIKA	1963	1963
TANZANIA	1964	2004
THAILAND	1934	2004
TOGO	1961	1966
TONGA	1970	2004
TRINIDAD	1962	2004
TUNISIA	1958	1998
TURKEY	1920	2004
UAR	1960	1970
UGANDA	1962	2004
UK	1800	2004
UKRAINE	1991	2004
URUGUAY	1904	2004
US	1800	2004
VANUATU	1980	2004
VENEZUELA	1959	2004
VIETNAM	1993	2004
VIETNAM DR	1970	1975
WESTN SAMOA	1963	1997
YEMEN PDR	1967	1989
YUGOSLAVIA	1920	2003
ZAMBIA	1964	2004
ZIMBABWE	1980	2001

L2

Effective second legislative chambers (L2=1) are found in countries where L1=1 <u>and</u> records on the composition of such a legislative chamber exist <u>and</u> where that legislative chamber is elected under a distinct electoral system <u>and</u> has a substantive (not merely delaying) role in the implementation of fiscal policy as documented in <u>The Statesmen's Yearbook</u> and <u>The Political Handbook of the World</u>. The following 56 countries have between the minimum and maximum years specified (though not necessarily continuously) had an effective second legislative chamber:

cnts_country	MinOfYear	MaxOfYear
ALGERIA	1998	2004
ARGENTINA	1928	2004
ARMENIA	1991	1992
AUSTRALIA	1928	2004

AUSTRIA	1927	2004
BELGIUM	1830	2004
BOLIVIA	1895	2004
BRAZIL	1928	2004
CANADA	1928	2004
CEYLON	1966	1970
CHILE	1932	2004
COLOMBIA	1930	2004
CONGO	1993	1996
CZECH REP	1993	2004
CZECHOS'KIA	1927	1992
DENMARK	1927	1953
DOMIN REP	1928	2004
ESTONIA	1991	1992
FRANCE	1927	2004
GERMAN FR	1971	1973
GREECE	1930	1934
HAITI	1996	2004
ICELAND	1929	1959
INDIA	1977	2004
IRELAND	1927	1936
ITALY	1949	1959
JAMAICA	1962	2004
JAPAN	1928	2004
LESOTHO	1966	1968
MEXICO	1946	2004
MOROCCO	1998	2003
NAMIBIA	1993	1998
NETHERLANDS	1927	2004
NEW ZEALAND	1944	1950
NICARAGUA	1931	1933
NIGERIA	1999	2004
PAKISTAN	1986	1999
PALAU	1994	2004
PARAGUAY	1928	2004
PERU	1956	1959
PHILIPPINES	1954	2004
POLAND	1922	2004
ROMANIA	1927	2001
SENEGAL	2000	2001
SO AFRICA	1928	2004
SPAIN	1978	2004
SRI LANKA	1971	1971
SWEDEN	1927	1959
SWITZERLAND	1848	2004
TAIWAN	1997	2000
TRINIDAD	1962	2004
URUGUAY	1928	2004

US	1800	2004
VENEZUELA	1960	2000
YUGOSLAVIA	1960	2001
ZIMBABWE	1980	1982

J

The existence of an independent judiciary (J=1) is determined through the joint existence of a
POLITY score on executive constraints (*XCONST*) of at least 3 (see definition below) and,
where data is available, an ICRG score on Law & Order of at least 4 (see definition below).
Scores are only computed in the period after 1960.

The following 92 countries have between the minimum and maximum years specified (though
not necessarily continuously) had an effective judiciary:

cnts_country	MinOfYear	MaxOfYear
ALBANIA	1994	1996
ARGENTINA	1993	2001
ARMENIA	1998	1998
AUSTRALIA	1960	2004
AUSTRIA	1960	2004
BARBADOS	1966	2004
BELGIUM	1960	2004
BENIN	1991	2004
BOTSWANA	1966	2004
BRAZIL	1960	1993
BULGARIA	1990	2004
BURKNA FASO	2001	2004
CANADA	1960	2004
CHILE	1960	2004
COSTA RICA	1960	2004
CROATIA	1999	2004
CUBA	1960	1960
CYPRUS	1990	2004
CZECH REP	1993	2004
CZECHOS'KIA	1968	1992
DENMARK	1960	2004
DOMIN REP	1994	2000
ECUADOR	1979	1997
EGYPT	1994	2004
ESTONIA	1991	2004
ETH'PIA PDR	1996	2004
FED MALAYA	1960	1962
FINLAND	1960	2004
FRANCE	1969	2004
GAMBIA	1986	1993
GERMAN FR	1960	1989
GERMANY	1990	2004

GREECE	1991	1998
GUYANA	1995	2001
HONG KONG	1843	1996
HUNGARY	1989	2004
ICELAND	1960	2004
INDIA	1993	2004
IRELAND	1960	2004
ISRAEL	1992	2004
ITALY	1960	2004
JAPAN	1960	2004
JORDAN	1992	2004
KENYA	1985	1997
KOREA REP	1992	2004
KUWAIT	1993	2004
LATVIA	1991	2004
LESOTHO	1993	1997
LITHUANIA	1991	2004
LUXEMBOURG	1960	2004
MACEDONIA	2003	2004
MADAGASCAR	1985	1989
MALAWI	1995	2001
MALAYSIA	1963	2004
MEXICO	1984	1984
MOLDOVA	1994	2004
MONGOLIA	1993	2004
MOROCCO	1992	2004
NAMIBIA	1992	2004
NETHERLANDS	1960	2004
NEW ZEALAND	1960	2004
NICARAGUA	1995	2004
NORWAY	1960	2004
PAKISTAN	1996	1997
PAPUA NEW G	1976	1989
PARAGUAY	1992	1998
PHILIPPINES	1994	1999
POLAND	1989	2004
PORTUGAL	1974	2004
ROMANIA	1992	2004
RUSSIA	1996	1998
SINGAPORE	1984	2004
SLOVAK REP	1993	2004
SLOVENIA	1991	2004
SO AFRICA	1994	1996
SPAIN	1975	2004
SRI LANKA	1995	1997
SWEDEN	1960	2004
SWITZERLAND	1960	2004
TAIWAN	1984	2004

TANZANIA	1989	2004
THAILAND	1988	2002
TRINIDAD	1962	2002
TUNISIA	1992	1998
TURKEY	1992	2004
UGANDA	1997	2004
UK	1960	2004
UKRAINE	1998	2004
US	1960	2004
VENEZUELA	1961	2001
ZAMBIA	1995	2004
ZIMBABWE	1993	1999

F

Independent sub-federal entities (states, provinces, regions, …) are coded (F=1) when these institutions impose substantive constraints on national fiscal policy as indicated in The Statesmen's Yearbook or The Political Handbook of the World. Scores are only computed in the period after 1960.

The following 13 countries have between the minimum and maximum years specified (though not necessarily continuously) had effective sub-federal veto players:

Country	Min_year	Max_year
AUSTRALIA	1960	2001
BELGIUM	1960	2001
BRAZIL	1960	2001
CANADA	1960	2001
CZECHOS'KIA	1991	1992
FIJI	1970	1999
GERMANY	1990	2001
GERMANY FR	1960	1989
SO AFRICA	1994	2001
SWITZERLAND	1960	2001
TRINIDAD	1987	2001
UA EMIRATES	1971	2001
US	1960	2001

NB: Values for 2000-2001 are author's subjective coding based upon the information provided in The Statesemen's Yearbook.

ALIGN E_L1

Alignment between the executive and the lower legislative chamber is coded (ALIGN E_L1=1) when the party controlling the executive branch is either the largest party in the lower legislative chamber or is a member of a ruling coalition in that chamber.

ALIGN_E_L2

Alignment between the executive and the upper legislative chamber is coded (ALIGN E_L2=1) when the party controlling the executive branch is either the largest party in the upper legislative chamber or is a member of a ruling coalition in that chamber.

ALIGN L1_L2

Alignment between the legislative chambers is coded (ALIGN L1_L2) when the same party or coalition of parties (when available) controls a majority in both legislative chambers.

LEGFRA lower and LEGFRA upper

Legislative fractionalization is approximately the probability that two random draws from the lower (upper) legislative chamber will be from the same party. The formula includes a modest adjustment to reflect the difficulty of maintaining a coalition as the number of parties in that coalition increases. The exact formula is:

$$1 - \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left[\frac{(n_i - 1)\frac{n_i}{N}}{N - 1} \right]$$

where n = the number of parties, n_i = seats held by nth party and N = total seats.

XCONST

As noted in the POLITY II Codebook (Gurr, 1990):

"Operationally, this variable refers to the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief executives, whether individuals or collectivities. Such limitations may be imposed by any "accountability groups." In Western democracies these are usually legislatures. Other kinds of accountability groups are the ruling party in a one-party state; councils of nobles or powerful. advisors in monarchies; the military in coup-prone polities; and in many states a strong, independent judiciary. The concern is therefore with the checks and balances between the various parts of the decision-making process. A seven-category scale is used.

(1) Unlimited Authority: There are no regular limitations on the executive's actions (as distinct from irregular limitations such as the threat or actuality of coups and assassinations). Examples of evidence:
        i. Constitutional restrictions on executive action are ignored.
        ii. Constitution is frequently revised or suspended at the executive's initiative.

iii. There is no legislative assembly, or there is one but it is called
   and dismissed at the executive's pleasure.
iv. The executive appoints a majority of members of any accountability
   group and can remove them at will.
v. The legislature cannot initiate legislation or veto or suspend acts of the executive.
vi. rule by decree is repeatedly used.

Note 2.3: If the executive is given limited or unlimited power by a legislature
to cope with an emergency and relents this power after the emergency
has passed, this is <u>not</u> a change to unlimited authority.

(2) Intermediate Category

(3) Slight to Moderate Limitations an Executive Authority:
There are some real but limited restraints on the executive. Evidence:
   i. The legislature initiates some categories of legislation.
   ii. The legislature delays implementation of executive acts and decrees.
   iii. The executive fails to change some constitutional restrictions, such
      as prohibitions on succeeding himself, or extending his term.
   iv. The ruling party initiates some legislation or takes some
      administrative action independently of the executive.
   v. The legislature or party approves some categories of appointments nominated by the
      executive.
   vi. There is an independent judiciary.
   vii. Situations in which there exists a civilian executive, but in which policy decisions, for
      all practical purposes, reflect the demands of the military.

(4) Intermediate Category

(5) Substantial Limitations cm Executive Authority: The executive has more
effective authority than any accountability group but is subject to substantial constraints by them.
Examples:
   i. A legislature or party council often modifies or defeats executive proposals for action.
   ii. A council or legislature sometimes refuses funds to the executive.
   iii. The accountability group makes important appointments to administrative posts.
   iv. The legislature refuses the executive permission to leave the country.

(6) Intermediate Category

(7) Executive Parity or Subordination: Accountability groups have effective
authority equal to or greater than the executive inmost areas of activity.
Examples of evidence:
   i. A legislature, ruling party, or council of nobles initiates much or most important
      legislation.
   ii. The executive (president, premier, king, cabinet, council) is chosen by the
      accountability group and is dependent on its continued support
      to remain in office (as in most parliamentary systems).

iii. In multi-party democracies, there is chronic "cabinet instability."

<u>LAW & ORDER</u>

As noted in (*Political Risk Services*, 1996):

"A country with a sound law and order tradition has sound political institutions, a strong court system and provisions for an orderly succession of power. This indicator reflects the degree to which the citizens of the country are willing to accept the established institutions to make and implement laws and adjudicate disputes. A high point total means that there is a strong law and order tradition, while a low point total means that there is a tradition of depending on physical force or illegal means to setting claims."

<u>Executive Name</u>

The Name of the Head of State

<u>Executive Party</u>

The partisan affiliation of the Head of state

<u>Executive Elected By</u>

The process of selection for the Head of State

<u>Executive Vote Share</u>

The percentage of the vote received among the selectorate by the Head of State

<u>Prime Minister Name</u>

The Name of the Prime Minister

<u>Prime Minister Party</u>

The partisan affiliation of the Prime Minister

<u>Executive Party (dominant)</u>

The party controlling the dominant executive body

<u>Party Count Lower</u>

The number of parties in the lower legislative chamber

<u>TSL</u>

The total number of seats in the lower legislative chamber

<u>Party # name lower</u>

The name of the # largest party in the lower legislative chamber (up to 15 parties)

<u>P#l</u>

The number of seats held by the # largest party in the lower legislative chamber

<u>Party # name upper</u>

The name of the # largest party in the lower legislative chamber (up to 15 parties)

<u>P#u</u>

The number of seats held by the # largest party in the lower legislative chamber

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